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This paper extends the recent literature on equilibria with coordination failures to arbi-
trary convex sets of admissible prices. We introduce a new equilibrium concept, called
quantity constrained equilibrium (QCE), giving a uniﬁed treatment to all cases considered
in the literature so far. At a QCE the expected trade opportunities on supply and demand
are completely determined by a rationing vector satisfying that the prevailing price system
maximizes the value of the rationing vector within the set of admissible prices. When the
set of admissible prices is compact, we show the existence of a connected set of non-trivial
QCEs. This set connects two trivial no-trade equilibria, one with completely pessimistic
expectations concerning supply opportunities and one with completely pessimistic expec-
tations concerning demand opportunities. Moreover, the set contains for every commodity
a generalized Drèze equilibrium, being a QCE at which for that commodity no bind-
ing trade opportunities on both supply and demand are expected, and also a generalized
supply-constrained equilibrium at which no binding constraints on demand opportunities
are expected and for at least one commodity also not on supply. We apply this main result
to several special cases, and also discuss the case of an unbounded set of admissible prices.
Key words: exchange economy, rationing, coordination failures, price rigidities.
JEL-code: C62, C63, C68, D51.1 Introduction
This paper is motivated by the recent interest in equilibria with coordination failures. This
interest can be traced back to the work of Roberts (1987ab, 1989ab). These papers establish
the existence of a continuum of equilibria with quantity rationing of supply at competitive
prices in a class of economies characterized by homothetic preferences and constant returns
to scale. The important point made in these papers is that rationing is not due to price
distortions, but rather to pessimestic expectations concerning trade opportunities. Even at
competitive prices, there is a continuum of equilibria with rationing. Rationing is therefore
not due to wrong relative prices of commodities but is caused by coordination failures.
Several authors contributed further to the coordination failure literature by gener-
alizing the work of Roberts in a number of directions. Herings (1996ab, 1998) extends
Roberts’ results to an exchange economy with standard assumptions on the primitives and
allows for non-competitive prices. The set of admissible prices is obtained by specifying,
f o re a c hc o m m o d i t y ,al o w e rb o u n da n da nu p p e rb o u n do ni t sp r i c e . D r è z e( 1 9 9 7 )a n d
Citanna, Crès, Drèze, Herings and Villanacci (2001) treat the combination of ﬁxed and
ﬂexible prices and consider the framework of an economy with production. Drèze (2001)
focuses on explaining downward real price rigidities and understanding the nature and the
sources of the coordination failures. His arguments are based on the combination of un-
certainty and incomplete markets. When markets are incomplete, price regulations may
be used to generate Pareto improvements as stressed also by Drèze and Gollier (1993) and
Herings and Polemarchakis (2004).
In this paper we extend the results on equilibria with coordination failures to a
setting where the set of admissible prices is not given by a simple combination of ﬁxed and
ﬂexible prices or by a simple speciﬁcation of a lower and an upper bound on the prices of
all commodities. We are interested in sets of admissible prices that may reﬂect any kind
of price indexation or price linkages. Special cases of such sets of admissible prices have
been studied before in the ﬁx-price literature by Chetty and Nayak (1978), Kurz (1982),
Dehez and Drèze (1984), van der Laan (1984) and Weddepohl (1987). To deal with general
cases of price restrictions, we allow for an arbitrary convex set of prices and will deﬁne a
unifying equilibrium concept, called Quantity Constrained Equilibrium (QCE). Whereas
the literature of the previous paragraph takes an ad hoc approach in deﬁning an equilibrium
appropriate for the set of admissible prices studied, we pin down a common principle behind
all these deﬁnitions. This common principle is that pessimistic expectations concerning
supply or demand opportunities may only emerge at a certain price system, if that price
system maximizes the value of the rationing vector within the set of admissible prices. An
immediate implication of this principle is that pessimistic expectations concerning supply
or demand opportunities of a commodity are excluded when the price of that commodity
1is ﬂexible and that pessimistic expectations concerning supply (demand) possibilities of a
commodity may only occur when there is a downwards (upwards) price rigidity.
We show that in case the set of admissible prices is compact and only contains
positive price vectors, there exists a continuum of non-trivial Quantity Constrained Equi-
libria connecting two trivial equilibria. One trivial QCE is a fully supply-constrained
no-trade equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations concerning supply opportu-
nities for all commodities and prices such that the value of the total initial endowments
is minimized within the set of admissible prices. The other trivial QCE is a trivial fully
demand-constrained no-trade equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations con-
cerning demand opportunities for all commodities and prices such that the value of the
total initial endowments is maximized.
The connected set of non-trivial QCEs contains for every commodity a generalized
Drèze equilibrium, being a QCE at which for that commodity no binding constraints on
supply and on demand are expected, a generalized supply-constrained equilibrium, at which
no binding constraints on demand are expected and for at least one commodity also not on
supply, and a generalized demand-constrained equilibrium, at which no binding constraints
on supply are expected and for at least one commodity also not on demand.
In Section 5 we consider some applications and extensions. First we consider the
case of price indexation and show that our main theorem extends to all kinds of ad hoc
results that were obtained in the literature for special cases of price indexation. Second,
we consider cases in which the set of admissible prices is unbounded, allowing for models in
which some prices are fully ﬂexible, some prices are bounded, and other prices are linked.
In case the set of prices is unbounded, the connected set of QCEs is also unbounded with
some of the prices going to inﬁnity, while simultaneously for any commodity with price
bounded from above, its relative price tends to zero and eventually all consumers will have
complete pessimistic expectations concerning demand opportunities of such a commodity,
implying no trade for this commodity. In the limit the economy reduces to an economy
where trade only takes place in the commodities for which the prices are unbounded from
above. When the prices of these commodities are not tied to prices of other commodities,
these prices tend to Walrasian equilibrium values for this reduced economy. In case this
holds for all commodities, there is a connected set of QCEs leading from a fully supply-
constrained no-trade equilibrium to a Walrasian equilibrium. Since all consumers keep their
initial endowments at a fully supply-constrained equilibrium and the Walrasian equilibrium
is Pareto eﬃcient, this case is most striking as far as the potential detrimental eﬀects of
coordination failures are concerned.
The paper has been organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and dis-
cusses equilibria with coordination failures in case the prices are ﬁxed or restricted by a
2lower and upper bound. Section 3 introduces the general concept of Quantity Constrained
Equilibrium. For the compact, convex case with positive prices the existence result is given
in Section 4. In Section 5 we consider the application of general price indexation and the
extension to unbounded admissible sets of prices.
2 Equilibria with Coordination Failures
We consider an exchange economy E =( {X i, i,w i}m
i=1,P). In this economy there are
m consumers, indexed i =1 ,...,m,a n dn commodities, indexed j =1 ,...,n.F o r k a
positive integer, we denote Ik = {1,...,k}. Each consumer i ∈ Im is characterized by a
consumption set X i, a preference preordering  i on X i, and a vector of initial endowments
wi. The total endowment w is deﬁned by w =
￿
i∈Im wi. We assume that the admissible
price systems in the economy E are described by the set P ⊂ IR
n
+. Several speciﬁcations of
P that have been analyzed in the literature will be considered in this section.
The following standard assumptions X, U and W with respect to the economy E are
made.
Assumption X
For every consumer i ∈ Im, the consumption set X i is a closed and convex subset of IR
n
+




For every consumer i ∈ Im, the preference preordering  i on X i is complete, continuous,
strongly monotonic, and strictly convex.1
Assumption W
For every consumer i ∈ Im, the vector of initial endowments wi belongs to the interior of X i.
The assumption of strict convexity allows us to work with demand functions instead of
demand correspondences and thereby simpliﬁes our notation. All our results carry over to
the case of convex preferences. Also the assumption of strongly monotonic preferences is
made for the sake of simplicity and can be relaxed considerably.
Suppose that trade takes place at prices p ∈ P. It is not necessarily the case that p
corresponds to a competitive equilibrium price system. As a consequence, there might be
1A preference preordering  i is said to be strongly monotonic if xi, ￿ xi ∈X i, xi ≤ ￿ xi, and xi  = ￿ xi
implies ￿ xi  i xi. A preference preordering  i is said to be strictly convex when for any pair xi, ￿ xi ∈X i,
such that xi  = ￿ xi, xi ∼i ￿ xi, it holds that λxi +( 1− λ)￿ xi  i xi for λ ∈ (0,1).
3markets with excess demand and markets with excess supply. In both cases, one needs a
distributional rule to determine the ﬁnal allocation that will result. Such a distributional
rule is called a rationing system. For example, in case of excess demand, some households
could expect to be rationed on their net demand opportunities, and in case of excess supply
some households could expect to be rationed on their net supply opportunities. In this
paper we consider the case where the rationing system is uniform. In a uniform rationing
system, all households that experience supply (demand) rationing in a certain market, will
end up with the same net supply (demand) of the commodity concerned. Our results carry
over to a variety of other rationing systems, see Herings (1996a) for a general treatment of
rationing systems.
The expectations of available supply opportunities for a household on the various
markets are described by a vector   ∈− IR
n
+, and the expectations of available demand
opportunities by a vector u ∈ IR
n
+. In equilibrium, the expected trade opportunities are
required to be rational. The expectations of trade opportunities should therefore match
the amounts allocated by the rationing system.
Given a price system p ∈ P and expected trade opportunities   for supply and u for




i | p · x
i ≤ p · w




k ≤ uk, ∀k ∈ In}.
The corresponding constrained demand di(p, ,u) of consumer i is deﬁned as the best
element for  i in Bi(p, ,u). Because of the strict convexity and strong monotonicity
assumptions, this element is unique and lies on the budget hyperplane, i.e. p·di(p, ,u)=
p · wi.
A well-known case discussed in the literature, see for instance Herings (1998) or
Citanna, Crès, Drèze, Herings and Villanacci (2001), is when the set P is equal to {p}, with
p ∈ IR
n
++ any price system, possibly a Walrasian equilibrium price system. A constrained
equilibrium may in this case be deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A Constrained Equilibrium for the economy E =( {X i, i,wi}m
i=1,{p}) is




+,a n d ,f o re v e r y
consumer i ∈ Im, a consumption bundle x∗i ∈Xi such that
(i) for all i ∈ Im, x∗i = di(p∗,  ∗,u ∗);
(ii)
￿m
i=1 x∗i = w;
(iii) for all k ∈ In: x∗h
k −wh
k =  ∗
k for some h ∈ Im implies x∗i
k − wi
k <u ∗




k for some h ∈ Im implies x∗i
k − wi
k >  ∗
k, ∀i ∈ Im.
4Condition (i) requires that the consumption of each consumer equals his constrained de-
mand, while Condition (ii) is the market clearing condition. Condition (iii) says that there
can not be (binding) pessimistic expectations simultaneously on both sides of a market,
i.e. markets are frictionless.
At a constrained equilibrium, pessimistic expectations are self-conﬁrming. Observe
that there exist two trivial equilibria. One is the fully supply-constrained equilibrium, with
completely pessimistic expectations concerning the supply of all commodities, so  ∗ =0 n
and allocation x∗i = wi, i ∈ Im. With completely pessimistic expectations concerning sup-
ply opportunities, no consumer will express a demand for commodities because of lack of
income. The other trivial equilibrium is the fully demand-constrained equilibrium, with
completely pessimistic expectations concerning the demand of all commodities, so u∗ =0 n
and allocation x∗i = wi,i∈ Im. With completely pessimistic expectations concerning
demand opportunities, no consumer will express any supply for commodities. As a conse-
quence, the completely pessimistic expectations concerning lack of trade opportunities are
in both cases conﬁrmed and are an extreme case of coordination failure.
It has been shown in Herings (1998) that there exists a connected set of non-trivial
constrained equilibria that connects both trivial equilibria. For the case where p cor-
responds to a Walrasian price vector, there is a clear incidence of coordination failures.
Although a ﬁrst-best Pareto eﬃcient allocation is achievable, i.c. the Walrasian equilib-
rium allocation, self-conﬁrming negative expectations can lead to an arbitrarily depressed
state of the economy. In case the expectations are completely pessimistic, trade will not
even take place.
The continuum result also admits very simple proofs of a number of special cases
that were treated in the ﬁx-price literature before, like the existence of a Drèze equilibrium
with respect to any a priorily chosen commodity (Drèze (1975)) and the existence of a
supply-constrained equilibrium (van der Laan (1980, 1982)). A Drèze equilibrium with
respect to commodity k is a constrained equilibrium without rationing in the market for
commodity k, so there are no pessimistic expectations concerning trade opprtunities for
commodity k. For example, commodity k could be the numeraire commodity. A supply-
constrained equilibrium is a constrained equilibrium without rationing on any demand, i.e.
expectations concerning demand opportunities are never binding, and without rationing on
the market of at least one commodity, so that in at least one market neither expectations
concerning supply opportunities nor expectations concerning demand opportunities are
binding. An algorithm to compute the connected set of constrained equilibria has been
proposed in Herings, Talman and Yang (1996).
In Drèze (1975), the set P is given by the cube
C
n = {p ∈ IR
n
+ | pk ≤ pk ≤ pk,k∈ In},
5where pk and pk are a priorily given lower and upper bounds for the price pk of good k ∈ In
satisfying 0 <p k ≤ pk. For this case, the deﬁnition of a constrained equilibrium is as follows
(Drèze (1975)).
Deﬁnition 2.2 A Constrained Equilibrium for the economy E =( {X i, i,w i}m
i=1,Cn) is




+,a n d ,f o re v e r y
consumer i ∈ Im, a consumption bundle x∗i ∈Xi such that
(i) for all i ∈ Im, x∗i = di(p∗,  ∗,u ∗);
(ii)
￿m
i=1 x∗i = w;
(iii) for all k ∈ In: x∗h
k −wh
k =  ∗
k for some h ∈ Im implies x∗i
k − wi
k <u ∗




k for some h ∈ Im implies x∗i
k − wi
k >  ∗
k, ∀i ∈ Im;
(iv) for all k ∈ In,i ft h e r ei si ∈ Im such that  ∗
k = x∗i
k − wi
k,t h e np∗
k = pk and if there
is i ∈ Im such that u∗
k = x∗i
k − wi
k,t h e np∗
k = pk.
The motivation for Conditions (i)-(iii) is as before. Condition (iv) precludes pessimistic
expectations concerning supply opportunities in the market of some commodity as long as
its price is not on its lower bound, whereas pessimistic expectations concerning demand
opportunities in the market of a commodity do not arise if its price is not on its upper
bound. Pessimistic expectations are only allowed when the price mechanism of falling
prices in case of excess supply and rising prices in case of excess demands is not allowed to
operate.
Observe that there again exist two trivial equilibria. One is the fully supply-
constrained equilibrium, with completely pessimistic expectations concerning the supply of
all commodities, so  ∗ =0 n, price system p∗ = p and allocation x∗i = wi, i ∈ Im. The other
is the fully demand-constrained equilibrium, with completely pessimistic expectations con-
cerning the demand of all commodities, so u∗ =0 n, price system p∗ = p and allocation
x∗i = wi,i∈ Im. It follows from the results of Herings (1998) that there exists a connected
set of non-trivial constrained equilibria that connects both trivial equilibria. Again, there
is a clear incidence of coordination failures, in particular for the case where Cn includes a
Walrasian equilibrium price system.
Constrained equilibria with diﬀerent expected supply and demand opportunities
may well yield the same constrained equilibrium allocation. When expectations concern-
ing supply opportunities are not binding, the precise speciﬁcation of the expected supply
opportunity  ∗
k is immaterial, as long as  ∗
k <x ∗i
k − wi
k for all i ∈ Im. Analogously, when





k for all i ∈ Im is compatible with a constrained
6equilibrium. The freedom in the speciﬁcation of non-binding opportunities can be used to
simplify notation and proofs by making a particular choice. We focus on expected trade
opportunities (l,u) that are represented by a single vector r ∈ [−w,w], called the rationing
vector, where [−w,w]={x ∈ IR
n|−w ≤ x ≤ w}. A rationing vector r ∈ [−w,w] induces
expected trade opportunities (l,u) given by
l = −w − r ≤ 0
n and u = w − r ≥ 0
n.
Taking use of the single vector r allows us to redeﬁne the concept of a constrained equilib-
rium on Cn as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.3 A Constrained Equilibrium for the economy E =( {X i, i,w i}m
i=1,Cn) is
ap r i c es y s t e mp∗ ∈ Cn, a rationing vector r∗ ∈ [−w,w], and, for every consumer i ∈ Im,
a consumption bundle x∗i ∈Xi such that
(i) for all i ∈ Im, x∗i = di(p∗,−w − r∗,w− r∗);
(ii)
￿m
i=1 x∗i = w;
(iii) for all k ∈ In,i ft h e r ei si ∈ Im such that −wk −r∗
k = x∗i
k −wi
k,t h e np∗
k = pk and if
there is i ∈ Im such that wk − r∗
k = x∗i
k − wi
k,t h e np∗
k = pk.
Since 0n ≤ x∗i ≤ w and 0n   wi   w and therefore −w   x∗i − wi   w for any i,a
negative value of r∗
k implies that only expected trade opportunities concerning the supply
of commodity k can be binding, in which case pk is on its lower bound, while the opposite
holds in case of a positive value of r∗
k. When r∗
k =0 , then expected trade opportunities on
neither the demand side nor the supply side of the market for commodity k can be binding.
Therefore Condition (iii) replaces both Condition (iii) and Condition (iv) of Deﬁnition 2.2.
The ﬁx-price literature has analyzed many sets of admissible prices P that cannot be
described by a lower bound and an upper bound on the price of each commodity. Important
examples concern cases where some of the prices are linked to prices of other commodities,
an obvious example being price indexation. For example, consider the case
P = {p ∈ IR
n
+ | pj ≤ pj ≤ pj,j∈ I, πj(pI) ≤ pj ≤ πj(pI),j∈ J} (1)
where I ⊂ In is a set of index commodities with prices bounded from below and above, pI
are the prices of the index commodities and J = In \ I is the set of indexed commodities
with prices bounded from below and above by the index functions πj(·) and πj(·), j ∈ J.
Because P is not a cube or a singleton, and thus there are no independently given lower
and upper bounds for the prices, we have to modify the complementarity Condition (iii) of
Deﬁnition 2.3. Under certain additional assumptions on P, this issue was raised already by
7Chetty and Nayak (1978), Kurz (1982), Dehez and Drèze (1984), van der Laan (1984) and
Weddepohl (1987). For example, Dehez and Dréze assume that for ﬁxed values ￿ pj it holds
that pj = pj = ￿ p, j ∈ I, implying that πj(pI)=πj(￿ pI) and πj(pI)=πj(￿ pI) are constant
for all p ∈ P,s ot h a tP reduces to P = {p ∈ IR
n
+ |pj = ￿ pj,j∈ I, pj ≤ pj ≤ pj),j∈ J},
with pj = πj(￿ pI) and pj = πj(￿ pI), j ∈ J. In van der Laan the set P in (1) is considered





j∈I pj, j ∈ J. Then after normalising
￿
j∈I pj =1 ,t h es e tP deﬁned in (1)
reduces to





pj =1 ,p j ≤ pj ≤ pj,j∈ J}, (2)
For this P van der Laan (1984) shows that there exists a supply-constrained equilibrium
such that at least one of the two following conditions hold: (i) there are no binding expected
trade opportunities for all commodities in I or (ii) there is no binding expected trade
opportunities for at least one of the commodities in J. When the latter condition holds in
equilibrium, there may be binding expected trade oppotunities for the index commodities
in I, illustrating the problem that Condition (iii) of Deﬁnition 2.3 does not need to be
satisﬁed. More precisely, if at least one of the commodities in I is constrained, then
typically there are binding expected supply opportunities concerning all commodities in I,
although due to the fact that
 
j∈I pj =1 , at least one of the prices pj, j ∈ I, is positive
and is not downwards rigid. This calls for a more general equilbrium concept for general
sets of admissible prices.
3 The General Case
An equilibrium concept for general price restrictions that allows for coordination failures
should contain the concept of Deﬁnition 2.2 as a special case and should also deal with a
set of prices as in (2) in a satisfactory way. To do so, the expected trade opportunities
( ,u) will be again induced by a rationing vector r ∈ [−w,w] and given by   = −w−r ≤ 0n
for supply and u = w − r ≥ 0n for demand.
It is clear that Conditions (i) and (ii) of Deﬁnition 2.2 should be imposed. Every
consumer maximizes utility given his budget and expected trade opportunities, and total
constrained demand equals total initial endowment on each market. The description of
expected trade opportunities by a rationing vector r ∈ [−w,w] will take automatically
care of these two conditions as in Deﬁnition 2.3 and also of Condition (iii) of Deﬁnition 2.2
that in equilibrium expected trade opportunities concerning the supply and the demand
of a particular commodity can never be binding simultaneously. When in equilibrium
rk > 0 there can be only binding expected trade opportunities concerning the demand of
8commodity k, and when in equilibrium rk < 0 there can be only binding expected trade
opportunities concerning the supply of commodity k. Moreover, when in equilibrium rk =0
there can be no binding expected trade opportunities at all concerning commodity k.
It is more diﬃcult to generalize Condition (iv) of Deﬁnition 2.2. Consistent with
Walrasian tatonnement, when prices can not be adjusted in such a way that the uncon-
strained excess demands and supplies are expected to decrease (in absolute value) according
to the Law of Supply and Demand, pessimistic expected trade opportunities take over and
will constrain individual excess demand or supply accordingly. Formally, we require that at
a constrained equilibrium the rationing vector r ∈ [−w,w] is such that it points outwards
to P at the prevailing price vector p, i.e. p · r =m a x {ˆ p · r|ˆ p ∈ P}.I n t h e s e q u e l a p a i r
(p,r) satisfying this property will be called stable.
In our equilibrium concept for the general case of a set P of admissible prices to
be deﬁned below we will require that the equilibrium pair (p∗,r ∗) is stable. This implies
that rationing is not binding when the equilibrium price vector p∗ lies in the interior of the
set P, because then the pair (p∗,r ∗) can only be stable when r∗ =0 n.S i n c ep∗ lies in the
interior of P, prices are fully ﬂexible and can be adjusted according to the Law of Supply
and Demand and therefore excess demand or excess supply need not be constrained by
rationing. If p∗ does not lie in the interior of the set P, which for example is always the
case when P is not full-dimensional, then the stableness property implies that the rationing
vector r∗ points outwards to P at p∗, being a direction into which the price vector cannot
be further adjusted according to the Law of Supply and Demand. The collection of all
these directions is called the normal cone at p∗ to P. For p ∈ P, the normal cone G(p) to
P at p is given by
G(p)={y ∈ IR
n|ˆ p · y ≤ p · y for any ˆ p ∈ P}.
So, the normal cone G(p) of P at p determines precisely the rationing vectors that may
occur at p and thus the stability concept is therefore equivalent to the requirement that
r ∈ G(p). This gives us the following deﬁnition of the general concept of a Quantity
Constrained Equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Quantity Constrained Equilibrium)
A Quantity Constrained Equilibrium (QCE) for the economy E =( {X i, i, wi}m
i=1,P) is a
price system p∗ ∈ P, a rationing vector r∗ ∈ [−w,w], and, for every consumer i ∈ Im,a
consumption bundle x∗i ∈Xi satisfying
(i) for all i ∈ Im, x∗i = di(p∗,−w − r∗,w− r∗);
(ii)
 m
i=1 x∗i = w;
(iii) r∗ ∈ G(p∗).
9Condition (iii) links the rationing vector to the price restrictions. Expected trade oppor-
tunities are completely determined by a vector r∗ in the normal cone G(p∗) to the set of
admissible prices P at the equilibrium price system p∗.I nc a s et h a tP equals Cn, consider a
pair (p∗,r ∗) with r∗
k positive. Then such a pair can only be stable when p∗
k = pk. Similarly,
when r∗
k is negative, the pair can only be stable when p∗
k = pk. Therefore, in this case the
requirement that (p∗,r ∗) is stable yields Condition (iii) of Deﬁnition 2.3. For the set P
given in (2), it holds for any positive price vector p and any r ∈ G(p) that rk = rh for
every two indices k and h in the index set I. Hence, if expected trade opportunities con-
cerning these commodities are binding, then according to Condition (iii) of Deﬁnition 3.1,
the expected trade opportunities are the same for all commodities in I.
In general, since 0n ≤ x∗i ≤ w and 0n   wi   w, in a QCE it holds that −wk <
x∗i
k − wi
k <w k for all k ∈ In and i ∈ Im. Hence, in a QCE, a consumer i ∈ Im can
only face binding expected demand opportunities for good k if r∗
k = wk − (x∗i
k − wi
k) > 0.
Analogously, some consumer i ∈ Im can only face binding expected supply opportunities
for good k if r∗
k = −wk −(x∗i
k −wi
k) < 0. Notice that the more the expectations concerning
supply (demand) opportunities of commodity k are pessimistic, the closer its rationing
level r∗
k is to −wk (to wk). In particular, expectations concerning supply opportunities of
commodity k are completely pessimistic if r∗
k = −wk and expectations concerning demand
opportunities of commodity k are completely pessimistic if r∗
k = wk.W h e n p∗ is in the
interior of P,t h e nr∗ =0 n, in which case the expected demand opportunities equal w and
the expected supply opportunities equal −w, implying that in equilibrium the expected
trade opportunities are not binding and thus p∗ is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector.
Summarizing, in a QCE consumers maximize their utility in their constrained budget sets,
total demand equals total supply, there are no binding expected trade opportunities on
both supply and demand simultaneously, and the rationing vector points into a direction
such that the value of the rationing can not be increased by moving the price vector within
P.
From an economic point of view, it is of crucial importance that the equilibrium
concept is independent of the units of measurement that are used in the deﬁnition of a
commodity. Suppose that the unit of measurement used in the deﬁnition of commodity k is
multiplied by a positive constant αk,k=1 ,...,n.L e tα =( α1,...,α n). An economy E(α)
with initial endowments wi(α) given by wi
k(α)=wk/αk,k=1 ,...,n, s e to fa d m i s s i b l e
prices
P(α)={  p ∈ IR
n |   pk = αkpk,k=1 ,...,n, for some p ∈ P}
and appropriately redeﬁned consumption sets X i(α) and preference relations  i (α) should
have an equivalent set of QCEs as the economy E. More precisely, for each QCE (p∗,r ∗,x ∗)
of E there should be a QCE (p∗(α),r∗(α),x ∗(α)) of E(α) and vice versa, where p∗(α) is
10obtained from p∗ by componentwise multiplication by α, and r∗(α) and x∗(α) are obtained
from r∗ and x∗ by componentwise division by α. The following result claims that equivalence
indeed holds.
Theorem 3.2
For any choice of α   0, it holds that (p∗,r ∗,x ∗) is a QCE of E =( {X i, i,w i}m
i=1,P) if
and only if (p∗(α),r ∗(α),x ∗(α)) is a QCE of E(α)=( {X i(α), i (α),w i(α)}m
i=1,P(α)).
Proof.
It is obvious that (p∗,r ∗,x ∗) satisﬁes Conditions (i) and (ii) of Deﬁnition 3.1 of a QCE of
E if and only if (p∗(α),r ∗(α),x ∗(α)) satisﬁes Conditions (i) and (ii) of Deﬁnition 3.1 of a
QCE of E(α). It is easily veriﬁed that r∗ ∈ G(p∗) if and only if r∗(α) ∈ Gα(p∗(α)),w h e r e
Gα(p∗(α)) denotes the normal cone to P(α) at p∗(α). This shows that (p∗,r ∗,x ∗) satisﬁes
Condition (iii) of the deﬁnition of a QCE of E if and only if (p∗(α),r∗(α),x ∗(α)) satisﬁes
Condition (iii) of the deﬁnition of a QCE of E(α). Q.E.D.
4 Existence results
In this section we consider the case that P is a compact, convex set containing only positive
prices. In the next section we also allow for an unbounded set of admissible prices.
Assumption P




We ﬁrst show that there are two diﬀerent trivial no-trade QCEs, one with completely
pessimistic expectations concerning supply opportunities, implied by r∗ = −w,a n do n e
with completely pessimistic expectations concerning demand opportunities, implied by
r∗ = −w.L e tP 0 and P 1 be given by
P
0 = {p ∈ P|w · p ≤ w ·   p for all   p ∈ P}
and
P
1 = {p ∈ P|w · p ≥ w ·   p for all   p ∈ P}.
Under Assumption P, both P 0 and P 1 are non-empty, convex and compact and their
intersection is either empty or equal to P. Prices in P0 are such that the value of total
initial endowment p·w is minimized, and prices in P 1 are such that this value is maximized.
The next result claims that there is a trivial no-trade QCE with completely pessimistic
11expections concerning supply opportunities at any price in P 0 and a trivial no-trade QCE
with completely pessimistic expectations concerning demand opportunities at any price in
P1.
Theorem 4.1
For any p ∈ P0 there is a fully supply-constrained equilibrium with rationing vector r∗ = −w
and allocation x∗i = wi,i∈ Im. For any p ∈ P 1 there is a fully demand-constrained
equilibrium with rationing vector r∗ = w and allocation x∗i = wi,i∈ Im.
Proof.
Take any p ∈ P 0. By deﬁnition of P 0 we have that −w ∈ G(p). Taking r = −w gives for
any i ∈ Im that Bi(p,0n,2w)={wi} and hence di(p,0n,2w)=wi, implying that markets
clear and thus a no-trade equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations concerning
supply opportunities is obtained.
Analogously, take any p ∈ P 1. It holds that w ∈ G(p). Taking r = w,w eh a v ef o r
any i ∈ Im that Bi(p,−2w,0n)={xi ∈X i|xi ≤ wi} and hence by Assumption U that
di(p,−2w,0n)=wi, implying that markets clear and thus a no-trade equilibrium with
completely pessimistic expectations concerning demand opportunities is obtained. Q.E.D.
If at an QCE it holds that r∗ = −w or r∗ = w, we say that the QCE is trivial. Otherwise,
we call the QCE non-trivial. The existence of a continuum of non-trivial QCEs follows
from the next result, which says that there exists a connected set of QCEs containing both
a trivial no-trade equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations concerning supply
opportunities and a trivial no-trade equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations
concerning demand opportunities.
Theorem 4.2
Let E =( {X i, i, wi}m
i=1,P) be an economy satisfying Assumptions X, U, W and P.
Then there exists a connected set D of Quantity Constrained Equilibria of the economy E,
containing a fully supply-constrained equilibrium (p0,−w,w1,...,w m) for some p0 ∈ P0,
and a fully demand-constrained equilibrium (p1,w,w 1,...,w m) for some p1 ∈ P1.
Since the rationing vector is equal to −w at a fully supply-constrained equilibrium and
equal to w at a fully demand-constrained equilibrium, the connected set D contains a
continuum of non-trivial QCEs.
We continue this section with the proof of Theorem 4.2. We ﬁrst focus on the
equilibrating mechanism to ﬁnd a QCE. To do so, we introduce a set Q ⊂ IR
n containing
P a n dd e ﬁ n ef o re v e r yq ∈ Q an admissible price vector p(q) ∈ P and a rationing vector
r(q) ∈ [−w,w]. The set Q is taken to be
Q = {q ∈ IR
n |  q − p 2 ≤ 1 for some p ∈ P},
12so Q is the set of elements in IR
n l y i n ga tm o s ta tad i s t a n c e1f r o mP, using the Euclidean
norm, and thus includes the set P. In the sequel bnd(Q) denotes the boundary of Q and
int(Q) its interior. For any q ∈ Q, we deﬁne the corresponding price vector p(q) to be the
projection of q on P, i.e.
p(q)=arg min
p∈P  p − q 2.
Since by Assumption P, the set P is convex and compact, for every q ∈ Q it holds that p(q)
is uniquely deﬁned and is continuous in q, and q−p(q) ∈ G(p(q)). Moreover,  q−p(q) 2 ≤ 1,
with equality if and only if q ∈ bnd(Q). It also holds that p(q)=q if and only if q ∈ P.
The set Q has the following properties.
Lemma 4.3
(i) The set Q is a convex, compact, full-dimensional subset of IR
n and contains P in its
interior;
(ii) The boundary of Q is smooth.
Proof. The compactness follows from the compactness of P. That Q is full-dimensional and
contains P in its interior follows immediately from its deﬁnition. To prove convexity, take
any q1,q 2 ∈ Q and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, and let q(λ)=λq1+(1−λ)q2 and p(λ)=λp(q1)+(1−λ)p(q2).
Since P is convex, we know that p(λ) ∈ P. Moreover,  q(λ) − p(λ) 2 ≤ λ q1 − p(q1) 2 +
(1 − λ) q2 − p(q2) 2 ≤ 1. Therefore, q(λ) ∈ Q.
Property (ii) follows from the use of the 2-norm in the deﬁnition of Q.T a k e a n y
q∗ ∈ bnd(Q). Then  q∗−p(q∗) 2 =1and any q with  q−p(q∗) 2 ≤ 1 belongs to Q. Hence,
the normal cone at q∗ contains at most one vector with length one. Since Q is convex,
we know that the normal cone at q∗ is non-empty and upper-semicontinuous. Hence, the
normal cone at any boundary point q of Q contains a unique vector with length one and
this vector is continuous in q, i.e. the boundary of Q is smooth. Q.E.D.
We deﬁne the rationing vector r(q) corresponding to q by the function r : Q → IR








 q − p(q) 2(q − p(q)),q ∈ Q \ P.
Since  q−p(q) 2 goes to zero when q−p(q) converges to 0n and −wk ≤ minj∈In
wj
|qj−pj(q)|(qk−
pk(q)) ≤ wk, for all k ∈ In, it follows that r(q) goes to 0n when q c o n v e r g e st oap o i n ti nP.
This implies that r(q) is continuous in q. The other properties below immediately follow
from the deﬁnition of the function r.
13Corollary 4.4
The function r : Q → IR
n satisﬁes the following properties:
(i) r is continuous;
(ii) r(q) ∈ [−w,w] for all q ∈ Q;
(iii) rk(q)=wk if and only if
wk
qk−pk(q) =m i n j∈In
wj
|qj−pj(q)| and q ∈ bnd(Q);
(iv) rk(q)=−wk if and only if −
wk
qk−pk(q) =m i n j∈In
wj
|qj−pj(q)| and q ∈ bnd(Q);
(v) r(q) ∈ G(p(q)) for all q ∈ Q.





i(p(q),−w − r(q),w− r(q)),q ∈ Q.
Finally, for any consumer i ∈ Im we deﬁne the reduced demand function di : Q → IR
n
by di(q)=di(p(q),−w − r(q),w− r(q)). Because the set P is in the interior of IR
n
+,w e
have that for any q ∈ Q the price vector p(q) ∈ P is strictly positive. Notice that since
−w − r(q) can be equal to zero, the cheaper point assumption that is usually required to
show continuity of the budget correspondence, is violated. Nevertheless, it follows from
Theorem 2.2 in Herings (1996b) that Bi is continuous at any q ∈ Q. With Assumption U it
then follows that di is a continuous function and so is the reduced excess demand function







By Assumption U the budget constraint p(q) · di(q) ≤ p(q) · wi is always satisﬁed with
equality and hence Walras’ law holds, i.e. p(q) · z(q)=0for all q ∈ Q. The function z
satisﬁes the following properties.
Lemma 4.5 Under Assumptions X, U, W and P, the reduced excess demand function
z : Q → IR
n satisﬁes the following:
(i) z is continuous;
(ii) Walras’ law holds: p(q) · z(q)=0for all q ∈ Q;
(iii) rk(q)=−wk implies zk(q) ≥ 0 and rk(q)=wk implies zk(q) ≤ 0.
T h en e x tl e m m as h o w st h a taz e r op o i n to fz on Q induces a QCE.
Lemma 4.6
Let q∗ be a zero point of z on Q, i.e. z(q∗)=0 n.T h e n(p(q∗),r(q∗),d 1(q∗),...,d m(q∗)) is
a Quantity Constrained Equilibrium.
14Proof.
We have to show that Conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of Deﬁnition 3.1 hold. Clearly, p(q∗) ∈ P,
r(q∗) ∈ [−w,w], and Conditions (i) and (ii) hold by construction of the reduced excess de-
mand function. By property (v) of Corollary 4.4 we have that r(q∗) is an element of
G(p(q∗)), which shows that Condition (iii) of Deﬁnition 3.1 holds. Q.E.D.
From Lemma 4.6 it follows that the question of existence of a QCE reduces to the existence
o faz e r op o i n to fz. Before stating our general result on the connected set of equilibria in
terms of the parameter q, we ﬁrst show that there are two diﬀerent kinds of trivial zero
points of z, one corresponding to a trivial no-trade QCE with completely pessimistic expec-
tations concerning supply opportunities and one with completely pessimistic expectations
concerning demand opportunities. Let Q0 and Q1 be given by
Q
0 = {q ∈ Q|w · q ≤ w ·   q for all   q ∈ Q}
and
Q
1 = {q ∈ Q|w · q ≥ w ·   q for all   q ∈ Q}.
Clearly, since Q is compact, the sets Q0 and Q1 are both non-empty. Moreover, the
intersection of Q0 and Q1 is empty, since Q is full-dimensional.
Lemma 4.7
Each element in Q0 or Q1 is a zero point of z and yields a trivial no-trade quantity con-
strained equilibrium:
(i) Any q ∈ Q0 induces the fully supply-constrained QCE (p(q),−w,w1,...,w m) with
p(q) ∈ P 0.
(ii) Any q ∈ Q1 induces the fully demand-constrained QCE (p(q),w,w 1,...,w m) with
p(q) ∈ P 1.
Proof.
Take any q ∈ Q0. Clearly, q ∈ bnd(Q). By deﬁnition of Q0 we have that r(q)=−w and
p(q) ∈ P 0. It follows that, for any i ∈ Im,B i(q)={wi} and hence di(q)=wi, implying that
z(q)=0 n and thus q induces a no-trade equilibrium with completely pessimistic expected
supply opportunities.
Analogously, take any q ∈ Q1. Then r(q)=w and p(q) ∈ P1. It follows that, for any
i ∈ Im,B i(q)={xi ∈X i|xi ≤ wi} and hence by Assumption U that di(q)=wi, implying
that z(q)=0 n and thus q induces a no-trade equilibrium with completely pessimistic ex-
pected demand opportunities. Q.E.D.
15From this lemma it follows immediately that all trivial QCEs are induced by Q0 and Q1
and that every zero point of z not in Q0 or Q1 induces a non-trivial QCE. Theorem 4.2
now follows from the next result saying that Q contains a connected set C of zero points
of z having a non-empty intersection with both Q0 and Q1.
Theorem 4.8
Let E =( {X i, i, wi}m
i=1,P) be an economy satisfying Assumptions X, U, W and P. Then
there exists a connected set C ⊂ Q of zero points of z such that C∩Q0  = ∅ and C∩Q1  = ∅.
Proof.
Let γ0 and γ1 be such that
 n
k=1 wkqk = γ0 when q ∈ Q0 and
 n
k=1 wkqk = γ1 when q ∈ Q1.
Notice that γ0 and γ1 are well-deﬁned, γ1 >γ 0 and γ0 ≤
 n
k=1 wkqk ≤ γ1 for all q ∈ Q.F o r
some M>0,d e ﬁ n eX0 ⊂ IR
n by
X




wkxk = γ0, max
k∈In
xk ≤ M}
and, for 0 <α≤ 1, Xα ⊂ IR
n by
X







(γ1 − γ0)w, x
0 ∈ X
0}.
Clearly, for x ∈ Xα, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,w eh a v et h a t
 n
k=1 wkxk =( 1− α)γ0 + αγ1, and thus
 n
k=1 wkxk = γ0 when x ∈ X0 and
 n
k=1 wkxk = γ1 when x ∈ X1. Further, deﬁne
X = ∪α∈[0,1]X
α
and take M suﬃciently large that Q ⊂ X and that any q ∈ Q\(Q0∪Q1) lies in the interior
of X. Notice that Q0 = Q ∩ X0 and Q1 = Q ∩ X1.
We deﬁne the set X
0 = {x ∈ IR
n|
 n
k=1 wkxk = γ0}. Let τ(x) be the orthogonal
projection of x ∈ IR
n on X
0, i.e. τ(x)=x − λw for some λ ∈ IR .N e x t ,l e tt h es e t  X0 be
deﬁned by
  X
0 = {x ∈ X
0|x = τ(q + z(q)),q∈ Q}∪{ x ∈ X
0|x = τ(p(q)),q∈ bnd(Q)}.
Since Q is compact and z and τ are continuous functions, it follows that   X0 is a bounded
subset of X
0 and thus M can be taken so large that X0 contains   X0 in its relative interior.
For x ∈ X0 and α ∈ [0,1],d e n o t exα = x + α  n
k=1 w2
k
(γ1 − γ0)w ∈ Xα and deﬁne the





{τ(xα + z(xα))} if xα ∈ int(Q),
Conv({τ(xα + z(xα))}∪{ τ(p(xα))}) if xα ∈ bnd(Q),
{τ(p(q(xα)))} if xα ∈ X \ Q,
16for all (x,α) ∈ X0 × [0,1], where Conv(.) denotes the convex hull of a set and q(x) is the
orthogonal projection of x ∈ IR
n on Q. Clearly, X0 is compact and convex, the mapping ϕ
is upper semi-continuous, and for every (x,α) ∈ X0×[0,1] it holds that ϕ(x,α) is compact,
convex and non-empty. According to Browder’s theorem, see Browder (1960), there exists
a connected set C of ﬁxed points of ϕ in X0 × [0,1] such that C ∩ (X0 ×{ 0})  = ∅ and
C ∩ (X0 ×{ 1})  = ∅, i.e. there exists a connected set C in X0 × [0,1] satisfying
x ∈ ϕ(x,α), for all (x,α) ∈ C,
containing both a point in X0 ×{ 0} a n dap o i n ti nX0 ×{ 1}.H e n c e , t h e s e t C ⊂ X
deﬁned by
C = {x ∈ X|x = x
α, (x,α) ∈ C}
is a connected set in X such that C ∩ X0  = ∅ and C ∩ X1  = ∅.I tr e m a i n st ob es h o w n
that every element of C lies in Q and is a zero point of z.
Take any x ∈ C,t h e nx = xα for some (x,α) ∈ C. Suppose ﬁrst that xα ∈ X \ Q.
From the deﬁnition of ϕ it then follows that
x = τ(p(q(x
α))).
Since τ(x) is the projection of x on X0, there exists λ ∈ IR such that x = τ(p(q(xα))) =
p(q(xα)) − λw.S i n c exα − q(xα)=β(q(xα) − p(q(xα))) for some β>0, it follows that












(γ1 − γ0) − λ)w.
This implies that q(xα) − p(q(xα)) = δw for some δ ∈{ − 1
 w 2, 1
 w 2}.H e n c e ,e i t h e rα =0
and xα ∈ Q0, or α =1and xα ∈ Q1. This contradicts that xα ∈ X \ Q.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
xα ∈ Q for every xα ∈ C.
Next, suppose that xα ∈ int(Q).T h e nxα− α  n
k=1 w2
k
(γ1−γ0)w = x = τ(xα+z(xα)).

















α) · w =0 .
Hence, since p(xα)·w>0, we have that λ = α  n
k=1 w2
k
(γ1−γ0) and thus z(xα)=0 n, showing
that xα i saz e r op o i n to fz.























for some µ ∈ IR .W i t hβ1 + β2 =1and letting λ = µ − α  n
k=1 w2
k





First, suppose β1 =0 . Then, as before, it follows that xα − p(xα)=δw for some δ ∈
{− 1
 w 2, 1
 w 2}, implying that xα ∈ Q0 ∪ Q1. Hence, according to Theorem 4.7, z(xα)=0 n


















for some δ ≥ 0.S i n c exα ∈ bnd(Q),w eh a v et h a tt h e r ei sk such that |rk(xα)| = wk. When



















































for all h ∈ In and therefore z(xα)=0 n due to Walras’ law. Q.E.D.
The theorem says that there is a connected set C in Q of zero points of the reduced ex-
cess demand function z, containing at least a trivial zero point q0 in Q0 and a trivial zero
point q1 in Q1.S i n c e Q0 and Q1 have a non-empty intersection, there must be a con-
nected set of non-trivial zero points between Q0 and Q1. According to Lemma 4.6 every
18non-trivial zero point q∗ ∈ C of z induces a non-trivial quantity constrained equilibrium
(p∗,r ∗,x ∗)=( p(q∗),r(q∗),d(q∗)),w h e r ed(q∗)=( d1(q∗),...,d m(q∗)) is the demand allo-
cation induced by q∗. In order to prove Theorem 4.2 we still have to show that the set
{(p(q),r(q),d(q))|q ∈ C} is a connected set.
Proof of Theorem 4.2
Take the function f:Q → P × IR
n ×
 




Consider the connected set C of zero points of z as deﬁned in Theorem 4.8. It follows by
Lemma 4.6 that every point in C induces a QCE of E. Since f is a continuous function
and by Theorem 4.8 C is connected, it follows that the set D = {x|x = f(q),q∈ C} is
connected. By Lemma 4.7, it follows that f(q) is a fully supply-constrained equilibrium
whenever q ∈ Q0 and f(q) is a fully demand-constrained equilibrium whenever q ∈ Q1.
Since C intersects both Q0 and Q1, the set D contains both a fully supply-constrained
equilibrium and a fully demand-constrained equilibrium. Q.E.D.
We have proved now that there exists a connected set of non-trivial quantity constrained
equilibria connecting a no-trade equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations con-
cerning supply opportunities and a no-trade equilibrium with completely pessimistic ex-
pectations concerning demand opportunities. Each quantity constrained equilibrium is in-
duced by some q ∈ Q.A n yq in Q0 or in Q1 yields a trivial quantity constrained equilibrium,
whereas any q∗ in C not in Q0 or Q1 yields a non-trivial quantity constrained equilibrium.
If q∗ ∈ P, then p(q∗)=q∗ is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector, the rationing vector
r(q∗)=0 n, and the induced expected trade opportunities given by ( ∗,u ∗)=( −w,w) are
not binding, i.e. no consumer faces binding expected trade opportunities on either the
demand side or the supply side and there is no coordination failure. If q∗ is not in P
and so p(q∗)  = q∗, then the price vector p∗ = p(q∗) lies on the boundary of the set P of
admissible prices and the rationing vector r∗ = r(q∗) lies in the normal cone G(p∗) at p∗
to P, and so the prices cannot be adjusted further at p∗ in the direction r∗.T h ev e c t o rr∗
then determines the pessimistic expected trade opportunities ( ∗,u ∗)=( −w −r∗,w−r∗).
Expected trade opportunities on supply can only be binding for commodity k when r∗
k < 0
and expected opportunities on demand can only be binding for commodity h when r∗
h > 0.
In these cases coordination failure takes place if some of the expected trade opportunities
are binding.
Having proved that there exists a connected set of QCEs connecting a trivial fully supply-
constrained no-trade equilibrium and a trivial fully demand-constrained no-trade equilib-
rium, it is easy to show that this set contains several non-trivial QCEs with some speciﬁc
19properties. These properties are most easily stated in terms of the parametrization by the
set Q, with each q ∈ Q inducing a price p(q), a rationing vector r(q), and an allocation
(d1(q),...,d m(q)).
First of all, recall that for any q0 ∈ C ∩ Q0 it holds that r(q0)=−w a n dt h a tf o r
any q1 ∈ C ∩Q1 it holds that r(q1)=w. Therefore, since C connects Q0 and Q1 and r is a
continuous function on Q, for any a priori chosen k ∈ In there exists a q(k) ∈ C satisfying
rk(q(k)) = 0. Such a q(k) induces expected trade opportunities ( ,u) with  k = −wk and
uk = wk. The point q(k) in Q therefore induces a QCE at which no consumer faces binding
expected opportunities concerning commodity k. We call such an equilibrium a generalized
Drèze equilibrium with respect to commodity k.
Corollary 4.9
For any k ∈ In, there exists a generalized Drèze equilibrium with respect to commodity k.
The corollary implies that if commodity k is the numeraire, there exists a QCE at which
there are no binding expected trade opportunities concerning the numeraire.
The connected set C also contains a point q− satisfying maxj rj(q−)=0 . This ele-
ment of C induces a QCE where for at least one commodity there are no binding expected
trade opportunities and for all other commodities there may only be binding expected
supply opportunities and therefore is a generalized supply-constrained equilibrium. Sim-
ilarly, there exists a QCE at which consumers may only face binding expected demand
opportunities and for at least one commodity there are no binding expected trade oppor-
tunities, and is therefore what we call a generalized demand-constrained equilibrium. Such
an equilibrium is induced by a point q+ in C for which minj rj(q+)=0 . Notice that both
types of equilibria are QCEs for which there are no binding expected trade opportunities
concerning at least one commodity, but it cannot be said a priorily which commodity.
Corollary 4.10
There exists a generalized supply-constrained equilibrium and there exists a generalized
demand-constrained equilibrium.
5 Applications and extensions
5.1 Price indexation
In this subsection we apply the concept of QCE as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3.1 to the set of
admissible prices given in formula (1) of Section 2, i.e.
P = {p ∈ IR
n
+ | pj ≤ pj ≤ pj,j∈ I, πj(pI) ≤ pj ≤ πj(pI),j∈ J}. (3)
20This set satisﬁes the so-called noncircularity condition of Weddepohl (1987), saying that
the prices may not be indexed directly or indirectly by themselves. As discussed in Section
2, Dehez and Drèze (1984) and van der Laan (1984) have considered special cases of this set
by making additional assumptions on the upper and lower bound of the index commodities
or on the index functions. Here we only make some weak assumptions by assuming that for
any j ∈ I it holds that 0 <p j ≤ pj < ∞ and that for any j ∈ J, the lower bound function
πj is convex, the upper bound function πj is concave and that for all feasible pI it holds
that 0 <π j(pI) ≤ πj(pI) < ∞,s ot h a tP satisﬁes Assumption P. To give a characterization
of a QCE, for simplicity we assume that all index functions are continuously diﬀerentiable.
Suppose q ∈ Q induces a QCE and thus z(q)=0 n.S i n c er(q) ∈ G(p(q)),w eh a v e
that p(q) · r(q)=m a x p∈P p · r(q). From the ﬁrst-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions it then
follows that there exists nonnegative numbers λj and λj, j ∈ In, such that













rj(q)=λj − λj,j∈ J, (5)
and
λj(pj(q) − pj)=0 , λj(pj − pj(q)) = 0,λ jλj =0 ,j∈ I, (6)
λj(pj(q) − πj(pI(q))) = 0, λj(πj(pI(q)) − pj(q)) = 0,λ jλj =0 ,j∈ J. (7)
Recall that in a QCE Condition (iii) of Deﬁnition 3.1 is satisﬁed, but not necessarily
Condition (iv) of Deﬁnition 2.2. So, when there are binding expected supply (demand)
opportunities concerning a commodity, its price is not necessarily on its lower (upper)
bound. To make this more precise, take an indexed commodity j ∈ J. From (5) and the
last complementarity condition in (7) it follows that
λj = −rj(q) > 0 if rj(q) < 0, and λj = rj(q) > 0 if rj(q) > 0.
From the ﬁrst two complementarity conditions in (7) it then follows that pj(q)=πj(pI(q))
if there are binding expected supply opportunities for commodity j ∈ J and that pj(q)=
πj(pI(q)) if there are binding demand opportunities for commodity j ∈ J, i.e. in case of
binding expected supply (demand) opportunities the price of an indexed commodity is on
its lower (upper) bound given the prices pI(q) of the index commodities. For an index
commodity j ∈ I, in general such a clear link does not exist. For instance, suppose that
all index functions are monotonically increasing in pI and all the derivatives are positive.
21Now, if pk(q) < πk(pI(q)) for all k ∈ J,t h e nλk =0for all k ∈ J and it follows from
equation (4) that for all j ∈ I it holds







If also pk(q) >π k(pI(q)) for all k ∈ J,t h e nλk =0for all k ∈ J and thus rj(q)=λj − λj
for all j ∈ I, implying that there can only be binding expected trade opportunities for an
index commodity j ∈ I when its price is on its upper or lower bound. However, when the





and thus rj(q) may be positive even if λj =0and thus pj(q) is not on its upper bound. In
such a situation binding expected demand opportunities of an index commodity may occur,
not because its price is on its upper bound, but caused by the fact that the prices of the
indexed commodities cannot be decreased further. Similarly, if the prices of some indexed
commodities are on its upper bound, there may be binding expected supply opportunities
on index commodities, even when the prices of these index commodities are not on their
lower bounds.
Corollary 5.1
Let P be given as in (3) and let q ∈ Q be such that z(q)=0 n.T h e n ,f o ra l lj ∈ J,
pj(q)=πj(pI(q)) if rj(q) < 0 and pj(q)=πj(pI(q)) if rj(q) > 0.
When all index functions are monotonically increasing, then, for all j ∈ I,
pj(q)=pj if rj(q) < 0 and for all k ∈ J, pk(q) < πk(pI(q)),
and
pj(q)=pj if rj(q) > 0 and for all k ∈ J, pk(q) >π k(pI(q)).
Moreover, for j ∈ I,
pj(q) >p j and rj(q) < 0 implies that pk(q)=πk(pI(q)), for at least one k ∈ J
and
pj(q) < pj and rj(q) > 0 implies that pk(q)=πk(pI(q)), for at least one k ∈ J.
Corollary 5.1 characterizes a QCE in case the set P of admissible prices is given as in (3)
and generalizes therefore the results obtained in the literature before. In particular, for
every k ∈ In, there exists a generalized Drèze equilibrium with respect to commodity k and
there exists both a generalized supply-constrained and a generalized demand-constrained
equilibrium.
225.2 Unbounded sets of admissible prices
In this subsection we consider an extension allowing that the set of admissible prices is
unbounded. We show that there is an unbounded connected set of QCEs with at least
one of the prices going to inﬁnity. Let P be a convex, closed, unbounded set of admissible
prices in the interior of IR
n
+ and deﬁne Q = {q ∈ IR
n| q−p 2 ≤ 1, for some p ∈ P}.N o t i c e
that Q0 is non-empty, while Q1 is empty. For q ∈ Q,l e tp(q), r(q),a n dz(q) be deﬁned as
before. Let γ0 =
 n




and for any s>γ 0, Q(s)={q ∈ Q(s)|
 n
k=1 wkqk = s} as the upper boundary of Q(s).
Applying Theorem 4.8 to Q(s) and using the fact that Q(s) ∩ X0 = Q0 and Q(s) ∩ X1 =
Q(s), it follows that there exists a connected set of zero points of z in Q(s) containing a
point in Q0 and a point in Q(s) for any s>s 0. Clearly, a zero point in Q0 induces again
a fully supply-constrained no-trade equilibrium. However, in general a zero point in the
upper boundary Q(s) is not a fully demand-constrained equilibrium. The next theorem
says that there exists an unbounded connected set of zero points of z in Q containing a
point in Q0.
Theorem 5.2 Let E =( {X i, i, wi}m
i=1,P) be an economy satisfying Assumptions X, U
and W, and let P be a non-empty, convex, closed, unbounded set in the interior of IR
n
+.
Then there exists an unbounded connected subset C of Q such that C ∩ Q0  = ∅ and each
point in C is a zero point of the reduced excess demand function z.
Proof
For s>s 0,l e tC(s) be a connected set of zero points of z in Q(s) containing a point in Q0
and a point in Q(s).T a k eC = Q0 ∪ (∪s>s0C(s)). Since any point in Q0 is a zero point of
z,t h es e tC is an unbounded connected set of zero points of z in Q such that C ∩Q0  = ∅.
Q.E.D.
As a speciﬁc example we consider, for some arbitrarily small ε>0, the set P given by
P = {p ∈ IR
n
+ |pj ≥ ε, j ∈ M,
 
j∈I
pj =1 ,p j ≤ pj ≤ pj,j∈ I ∪ J}, (8)
where M, I and J form a partition of In.2 Observe that this set reduces to the set given
in formula (2) when M = ∅ and pj =0 , pj = ∞ for j ∈ I. Here we assume that for
2For simplicity we take prices bounded away from zero. The analysis can be extended to ε =0by
generalizing the concept of constrained equilibrium to quasi-constrained equilibrium as has been discussed
in Kurz (1982).
23any j ∈ I ∪ J it holds that 0 <p j ≤ pj < ∞ and
￿
j∈I pj < 1 <
￿
j∈I pj. Without
loss of generality, we may assume that I = {1,...,|I|} and wj+1 ≥ wj,j=1 ,...|I|−1.
Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, we restrict ourselves to the generic case that there is












j=j￿ pj > 1.
Suppose q ∈ Q induces a QCE and thus z(q)=0 n.A g a i n ,r(q) ∈ G(p(q)) implies
p(q) · r(q)=m a x p∈P p · r(q). From the ﬁrst-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions it then follows
that there exist nonnegative numbers λj, j ∈ M, nonnegative numbers λj,λj,j∈ I ∪ J,
and a number λI such that
rj(q)=−λj,j∈ M, (9)
rj(q)=λI − λj + λj,j∈ I, (10)
rj(q)=−λj + λj,j∈ J, (11)
and furthermore the following complementarity conditions hold
λj(pj(q) − ε)=0 ,j∈ M, (12)
λj(pj(q) − pj)=0 , λj(pj − pj(q)) = 0,λ jλj =0 ,j∈ I ∪ J. (13)
At a fully supply-constrained no-trade equilibrium we have that r(q)=−w,s ot h a tλj = wj
and hence pj(q)=ε for all j ∈ M, λj = wj, λj =0and hence pj(q)=pj for all j ∈ J,
while for j ∈ I it holds
λI − λj + λj = −wj.
We claim that λI = −wj￿.F o ra l lj =1 ,...,j −1 it holds that λj =0and λj = wj￿−wj ≥ 0,
λj￿ = λj￿ =0 , and for all j = j  +1 ,...,|I| it holds that λj =0and λj = wj − wj￿ ≥ 0. It
then follows immediately that prices of commodities j =1 ,...,j  − 1 satisfy pj = pj, and
prices of commodities j = j  +1 ,...,|I| satisfy pj = pj. Intuitively, from the properties
that p(q) · r(q)=m a x p∈P p · r(q),r (q)=−w and
￿
j∈I pj =1 , it follows that the prices
of the commodities with the larger total endowments are set on their minimum level, and
the prices of commodities with the smaller total endowments on their maximum level.
To formally show our claim, consider a commodity k ∈{ 1,...,|I|} = I such that
pk <p k(q) < pk. Such a commodity k exists, since we consider the case that there is





j∈I2 pj =1 . It follows immediately that
λk = λk =0 , so λI = −wk. Consider any commodity j ∈{ 1,...,k− 1}. Then it follows
from equation (10) that λj − λj = λI − rj(q)=λI + wj = −wk + wj ≤ 0, so that λj =0
and λj = wk − wj ≥ 0. Similarly, for any commodity j ∈{ k +1 ,...,|I|} it follows from
24equation (10) that λj − λj = −wk + wj ≥ 0, so that λj =0and λj = −wk + wj ≥ 0.


























so k = j . Summarizing, at a fully supply-constrained equilibrium, the prices of all the
numeraire and indexed commodities are on its lower bound, while the price of precisely
one index commodity is not bounded and the prices of the index commodities with larger
total endowments are set on their minimum level, and the prices of the index commodities
with smaller total endowments on their maximum level.
From the equations (9)-(13) it follows that at any QCE it holds that there may be
binding expected supply opportunities for a numeraire commodity, which only occurs when
its price is ε, while there can only be binding expected supply (demand) opportunities for an
indexed commodity when its price is on its lower (upper) bound. For an index commodity
j ∈ I binding expected opportunities can also occur when its price is not binding, due to
the restriction that the sum of the prices of the index commodities is equal to one. For
all commodities j ∈ I with non-binding prices we have that rj(q)=λI. Therefore, for
all these commodities there are either no binding expected trade opportunities (λI =0 ),
or the same amount of expected trade opportunities on either their demands (λI > 0)o r
their supplies (λI < 0). At a QCE induced by a point q satisfying
￿
j∈I qj =1 ,i th o l d s
that λI =0and there can only be binding expected supply (demand) opportunities for a
commodity in I if its price is on its lower (upper) bound. This conﬁrms the results in van
der Laan (1984) for the case that M = ∅.W h e n M  = ∅, the following result is also be
obtained.
Theorem 5.3 Let E =( {X i, i, wi}m
i=1,P) be an economy satisfying Assumptions X, U,
W and let the set P be as speciﬁed in (8). Then there exists an s>s 0 such that for all
zero points q ∈ Q of z with
￿n
k=1 qk ≥ s it holds that rj(q)=wj for all j ∈ I ∪J, pj(q) >ε
and rj(q)=0for all j ∈ M.
Proof.




25and z(qt)=0 n for all t ∈ IN.S i n c eP and thus also Q is bounded in any j ∈ I ∪J, without
loss of generality it follows that qt
k →∞for some k ∈ M.I ti so b v i o u st h a trk(qt)=0 . Now,
deﬁne It = {j ∈ I|rj(qt) <w j}, Jt = {j ∈ J|rj(qt) <w j} and Mt = {j ∈ M|pj(qt)=ε}.
Then, for any j ∈ I ∪J ∪Mt we have that
pj(qt)
pk(qt) goes to zero. Moreover, for all i ∈ Im and
j ∈ In, the demand di
j(qt) is bounded from above by wi
j +( wj − rj(qt)), while rk(qt)=0
implies net supply equal to −wk is possible for commodity k. For t suﬃciently large, for
any i ∈ Im, and for any j ∈ It∪Jt∪Mt, it follows from the monotonicity of the preferences
that di
j(qt)=wi
j +( wj − rj(qt)) >w i
j, contradicting z(qt)=0 n.H e n c eIt ∪ Jt ∪ Mt = ∅.
So, for t suﬃciently large it follows that rj(qt)=wj for all j ∈ I ∪ J,a n dpj(qt) >εand
rj(qt)=0for all j ∈ M. Q.E.D.
The theorem implies that there exists a connected set of QCEs containing a fully supply-
constrained equilibrium and an equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations con-
cerning the demand of the commodities in I∪J and no binding expected trade opportunities
at all on the commodities in M with prices above ε. Clearly, at the latter equilibrium it
must hold that for every consumer the consumption of the commodities in I ∪ J is equal
to its initial endowments of these commodities. Hence the prices of the commodities in
M are Walrasian equilibrium prices for a reduced economy with only commodities in M
and preferences on this reduced commodity space obtained from the preferences in E with
consumption of the commodities in I∪J equal to the initial endowments. At any q0 induc-
ing a trivial equilibrium we have that r(q0)=−w, while at any q inducing an equilibrium
with completely pessimistic expectations concerning demand opportunities of commodities
in I ∪ J and Walrasian prices for the commodities in M, it holds that rj(q)=wj for all
j ∈ I ∪ J,a n drj(q)=0for all j ∈ M. Observe that rj(q0)=−wj for all j ∈ I implies






































From this we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5.4 Let E =( {X i, i,w i}m
i=1,P) be an economy satisfying Assumptions X, U,
W and let the set P be as speciﬁed in (8). Then there exists a connected set of QCEs,
containing a fully supply-constrained no-trade equilibrium and the following types of equi-
librium:
(i) For any j ∈ I ∪ J, an equilibrium induced by a point q satisfying rj(q)=0 ,i . e . a
generalized Drèze equilibrium with respect to commodity j ∈ I ∪ J;
26(ii) An equilibrium induced by a point q satisfying rj(q)=0for all j ∈ M, i.e. a generalized
Drèze equilibrium without binding expected trade opportunities for commodities in M;
(iii) An equilibrium induced by a point q satisfying maxj∈In rj(q)=0 , i.e. a supply-
constrained equilibrium, so without binding expected opportunities for at least one of the
commodities;
(iv) An equilibrium induced by a point q satisfying maxj∈I∪J rj(q)=0 , i.e. a supply-
constrained equilibrium without binding expected trade opportunities for at least one of the
commodities in I ∪ J;
(v) An equilibrium induced by a point q satisfying
￿
j∈I qj =1 , i.e. for a commodity in
I there may only be binding expected supply (demand) opportunities if its price is on its
lower (upper) bound;
(vi) An equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations concerning the demands of the
commodities in I ∪ J and Walrasian prices for the reduced economy with commodities in
M.
At an equilibrium of type (iv) it may hold for some j ∈ M that rj(q) < 0 and hence
there are binding expected supply opportunities for some of the commodities in M.A t
such an equilibrium we have that for some h ∈ I ∪ J, rh(q)=0and ph(q) ≥ ph > 0 and
thus ph(q)(−wh − rh(q)) < 0. Now, suppose that rj(q) < 0 and thus pj(q)=ε for some
j ∈ M. From the monotonicity of the preferences it then follows for suﬃciently small ε
that di
j(q)=wi
j +( wj − rj(q)) >w i
j for all i ∈ Im, contradicting that zj(q)=0 .H e n c ew e
must have that rj(q)=0for all j ∈ M, implying that there are no binding expected trade
opportunities for all commodities in M.
Corollary 5.5 Let E =( {X i, i, wi}m
i=1,P) be an economy satisfying Assumptions X, U,
W and let the set P be as speciﬁed in (8). Then for ε suﬃciently close to zero, there
exists a supply-constrained equilibrium without binding expected trade opportunities for all
commodities in M and at least one of the commodities in I ∪ J.F u r t h e r , i f I ∪ J = ∅,
then the equilibrium of type (vi) is a Walrasian equilibrium for the economy E with price
set P = {p ∈ IR
n
+ |pj ≥ ε, j ∈ In}. In this case there is a connected set of equilibria
connecting a fully supply-constrained no-trade equilibrium with a Walrasian equilibrium.
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